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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 11-3083 
____________ 
 
ANNA McCLEMENT, 
 
                  Appellant 
 
v. 
 
PORT AUTHORITY TRANS-HUDSON 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 2-09-cv-00522) 
District Judge:  Honorable Stanley R. Chesler 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 1, 2012 
 
Before:  FUENTES, FISHER and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: November 20, 2012) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 Anna McClement appeals from the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to 
defendant Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation (“PATH”) on her allegations of age 
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discrimination and retaliation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.  We will affirm. 
I. 
 Because we write principally for the parties, who are familiar with the factual 
context and legal history of this case, we will set forth only those facts that are necessary 
to our analysis. 
 On July 6, 2007, McClement, a 47-year-old certified locomotive engineer 
employed by PATH, used her cell phone to order food while operating a seven-car 
passenger train.  Based on her inappropriate conduct, PATH charged McClement with 
violating its rules.  McClement accepted responsibility for her behavior, and PATH 
formally disciplined her by written reprimand and warning on August 1, 2007. 
PATH applies an unwritten, but well-established, promotional policy to a 
disciplined employee.  The process begins when PATH posts a promotional opportunity.  
PATH’s announcement describes the position’s eligibility qualifications, which usually 
include the requirement that the employee not be subject to pending disciplinary action as 
of the bulletin’s closing date.  PATH considers a disciplinary action to be “pending” for 
one year from the date it is instituted.  If the employee is subject to pending disciplinary 
action, he is automatically screened out of possible promotions; if not, he is screened in.  
PATH places screened-in employees on a horizontal roster, which lists all employees 
eligible for potential promotion.  PATH’s management retains the discretion to select the 
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best eligible employee from the horizontal roster for actual promotion.  The horizontal 
roster may last for longer than a year.  For this reason, if an employee eligible for 
potential promotion is disciplined after PATH places her on the horizontal roster, she 
remains on that list, even though she is ineligible for actual promotion during the one-
year pendency of her disciplinary action. 
On June 17, 2008, PATH posted a promotional opportunity for the operations 
examiner training program.  The announcement bulletin specified a closing date of 
July 2, 2008, and cautioned that “pending disciplinary action will disqualify a candidate 
from this promotional opportunity.”  On July 1, 2008, McClement applied, and on 
July 11, 2008, PATH notified her that it had screened her out because her July 2007 
disciplinary action was still pending.  PATH also screened out three other employees for 
the same reason.  PATH later placed four employees on the horizontal roster, two of 
whom were over 40 years old and were actually promoted. 
 On September 27, 2008, McClement filed an Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”) charge against PATH, alleging that PATH discriminated against 
her on the basis of her age.  On November 6, 2008, EEOC dismissed the charge as 
untimely. 
On October 15, 2008, PATH posted another promotional opportunity for the 
operations examiner training program, specifying a closing date of October 30, 2008.  
McClement re-applied, and because her disciplinary action was no longer pending, 
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PATH screened her in.  PATH placed McClement on the horizontal roster on 
November 24, 2008. 
On December 9, 2008, McClement used a fraudulent parking pass in an 
unauthorized PATH lot, and when questioned about the source of her counterfeit pass, 
she falsely stated that PATH had given it to her.  On February 9, 2009, PATH held an 
investigatory hearing after which it disciplined McClement by suspending her without 
pay for two weeks and suspending her parking privileges for six months.  PATH held an 
appellate hearing and denied McClement’s appeal on March 30, 2009.  The Public Law 
Board later sustained PATH’s discipline of McClement. 
As a result of her second disciplinary action, McClement became ineligible for 
promotion from February 23, 2009 to February 23, 2010.  When her discipline expired, 
PATH’s management decided McClement was not the right fit for the operations 
examiner position, which was “a job that held high integrity and responsibility,” because 
she had been “untruthful.”  Appellee’s Supp. App. at 5. 
On February 27, 2009, McClement filed a second EEOC charge, alleging that 
PATH (1) discriminated against her on the basis of her age by screening her out of the 
July 2, 2008 operations examiner training program and (2) retaliated against her for filing 
her first EEOC charge by disciplining her for her counterfeit parking pass.  On 
August 20, 2009, EEOC dismissed McClement’s second charge on the merits. 
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 On February 5, 2009, McClement filed the instant complaint under the ADEA.  
On October 28, 2009, McClement filed an amended complaint that incorporated the 
allegations in her second EEOC charge.  On June 29, 2011, the District Court granted 
summary judgment in favor of PATH.  McClement’s timely appeal to this Court 
followed. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.  Holender v. Mut. Indus. N., Inc., 
527 F.3d 352, 354 n.1 (3d Cir. 2008).  We apply the same test as the District Court, and 
will affirm its ruling if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party, we find that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Dilworth v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 
418 F.3d 345, 349 (3d Cir. 2005). 
III. 
A. 
 McClement argues that the District Court erred when it granted summary 
judgment to PATH on her claim of age discrimination under the ADEA.  We disagree. 
The ADEA makes it “unlawful for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to 
discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to 
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his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s age.”  29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).  This protection against age discrimination is 
“limited to individuals who are at least 40 years of age.”  Id. § 631(a).  When a plaintiff 
alleges that he has suffered age discrimination predicated on disparate treatment, liability 
under the ADEA depends on whether the plaintiff’s age “actually motivated the 
employer’s decision.”  Monaco v. Am. Gen. Assur. Co., 359 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993)). 
 Where, as here, a plaintiff proffers only indirect evidence of discrimination, we 
apply the familiar three-step McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework under which 
the plaintiff carries the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case.  Id. (citing 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).  If the plaintiff is able to show 
a prima facie claim of discrimination, the burden of production then shifts to the 
defendant “to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s 
rejection.”  McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.  If the defendant does so, the burden 
then shifts back to the plaintiff to give him an opportunity to show that the stated reason 
is in fact mere “pretext.”  Id. at 804. 
When a plaintiff complains of age discrimination under the ADEA based on his 
employer’s failure to promote him, the prima facie case requires him to show that (1) he 
was a member of the protected class, i.e., over 40 years old; (2) he was qualified for the 
new position; (3) he suffered an adverse employment decision, i.e., he was passed over 
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for the desired promotion; and (4) his employer’s refusal to promote him occurred under 
circumstances that give rise to an inference of age discrimination.  Monaco, 359 F.3d at 
300; Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., Inc., 191 F.3d 344, 357 (3d Cir. 1999). 
McClement argues that she established a prima facie case of discrimination under 
the ADEA.  She is incorrect.  With regards to the second requirement, in order for 
McClement to have been qualified for the promotional program, she must have been 
eligible for it.  But the bulletin that advertised the promotional program explicitly stated 
that “unsatisfactory attendance record, and/or pending disciplinary action will disqualify 
a candidate from this promotional opportunity.”  App. at 19 (emphasis added).  PATH’s 
policy is that all employees can be screened out of promotional opportunities for one year 
following any disciplinary action.  When McClement applied for the first promotional 
program on July 1, 2008, she was still within one year of her disciplinary action related to 
improper use of her cell phone, which occurred on July 6, 2007. 
McClement argues that (1) because the policy was unwritten, it could not be used 
against her and (2) the District Court erred by making a determination of credibility based 
on the testimony of a PATH employee.  But the mere fact that a policy is unwritten does 
not necessarily make it illegitimate.  See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 46, 53 
(2003) (holding that employer’s unwritten policy not to rehire certain types of former 
employees “plainly satisfied” its obligation to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for refusing to rehire plaintiff). 
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Moreover, the District Court did not base its decision on whether there was a 
policy solely on the testimony of one PATH employee.  Rather, McClement admitted in 
her testimony that she was aware of the policy and that before applying for the second 
promotional opportunity, she spoke with PATH management about whether her one year 
period had expired so that she could apply for the promotion. 
Because McClement failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, we 
need not decide whether PATH’s proffered non-discriminatory reason for its refusal to 
promote McClement was pretext.  We conclude that the District Court did not err in 
granting summary judgment to PATH on McClement’s ADEA discrimination claim. 
B. 
 McClement also contends that the District Court erred when it granted summary 
judgment to PATH on her claim of retaliation under the ADEA.  We disagree. 
In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the ADEA, a plaintiff 
must show that (1) she was engaged in a protected activity; (2) the defendant took an 
adverse employment action after or contemporaneous with the plaintiff’s protected 
activity; and (3) a causal link exists between the plaintiff’s protected activity and the 
adverse employment action.  Glanzman v. Metro. Mgmt. Corp., 391 F.3d 506, 508-09 (3d 
Cir. 2004). 
Neither adverse employment action at issue in this case amounted to retaliation 
under the ADEA.  The discipline issued on February 23, 2009, was due to McClement’s 
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display of a fraudulent parking pass, not because of her EEOC complaint.  To the extent 
that McClement argues that this discipline was based on a false allegation (and therefore 
pretextual), we disagree.  The disciplinary charge was sustained after a fair and impartial 
hearing at which McClement had a chance to present evidence and conduct cross-
examination.  It was then upheld after a proper appeal.  Finally, the Public Law Board 
sustained the charge, finding the discipline to be justified by McClement’s “willful 
deceit.”  Thus, PATH’s disciplinary action against McClement for her fraudulent 
behavior was justified. 
Nor was PATH’s November 2008 refusal to promote McClement due to 
McClement’s EEOC filing.  PATH’s training program announcement made it clear that 
PATH management has discretion to choose the order in which employees are selected 
for promotion.  McClement’s supervisor provided a legitimate reason for not choosing 
her for promotion when he expressed his belief that she lacked the candor needed for the 
job.  McClement offered no contrary evidence to show this decision actually was a result 
of her EEOC filing. 
We conclude that the District Court did not err in granting summary judgment to 
PATH on McClement’s ADEA retaliation claim. 
IV. 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the order of the District Court. 
